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Abstract  
Social security contributions make up around one fourth of total tax revenue in OECD 
countries. However, there are concerns on the economic effects of high levies on labour. 
Recent studies suggest that at least one third of taxes on labour are shifted onto 
employers, leading to higher wage costs. We find substantial evidence in the literature 
that the nature of social security contributions matters. With a clear connection between 
contributions and rights, the employee will perceive this contribution as a price and not 
as a tax. As a consequence, these contributions will be less distortive in terms of labour 
supply, wage costs and private savings.  
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1. Introduction 
Social security contributions represent a large share of total taxation in OECD countries 
(24.3 percent in 2013), and an even larger share in Continental Europe. Total employee 
and employer contributions exceeded 10 percent of GDP in half of the OECD countries. 
These contributions were originally introduced to finance various aspects of the welfare 
state (health, pensions, unemployment, disability, etcetera), based on the model of 
‘social insurance’. Three main functions of the welfare state are redistribution, including 
poverty alleviation, insurance against several social risks and income smoothing or 
reallocation of income over the life cycle (Barr, 1992; Barr and Diamond, 2009). Social 
security contributions can traditionally be associated with the insurance function of the 
welfare state and, as far as pensions are concerned, with the reallocation function. Over 
time, these contributions have evolved into (payroll) taxes, although with specific 
characteristics: (i) the tax base is labour earnings rather than income more broadly; (ii) 
contribution rates are generally flat, with a minimum and maximum threshold; (iii) 
contributions are split between employers and employees; (iv) the amount of benefits 
can be linked to the amount of contributions paid. 
Despite the importance of social security contributions, empirical studies of their 
economic effects are surprisingly rare (European Commission, 2015). This paper provides 
information on the nature, importance and development of social security contributions in 
OECD countries, and their effect on labour costs and employment and on private savings. 
Our motivation is as follows. 
Because social expenditure has risen quite rapidly in most countries, social security 
contributions have also shown an upward trend. At the same time, these contributions, 
and especially employers' social security contributions, have been blamed for destroying 
employment. Some European countries have implemented lower employers' social 
security contributions, funded through general taxation, with the aim to reduce these 
negative employment effects. The rationale for such policies is a belief that the economic 
effects of social security contributions, employee social security contributions and income 
taxes differ. It is often implicitly assumed that a decrease on the employee side leads to 
a higher labour supply. Similarly, a decrease in the employer social security contributions 
or payroll taxes is often assumed to raise the demand of labour. However, empirical 
studies on the effects are less clear cut.  
Knowledge on how welfare states should be financed at lowest social cost is lacking. 
Insight in economic incidence of social security contributions (who is ultimately made 
worse off by the tax) and their efficiency effects (the impact of these taxes on labor 
supply and demand) is crucial to identify best-practices among countries for tax policy. 
Although the incidence and behavioural effects of income taxes are extensively studied, 
the literature on payroll taxes or social security contributions is less extensive (Saez et 
al, 2012). The incidence of social security contributions might be different from the 
incidence of income taxes. First, social security contributions are legally shared between 
employees and employers. Second, the reactions to social security contributions may 
depend on the nature of these contributions: are they seen as taxes or as prices with a 
close link to benefits? 
This paper reviews the role of social security contributions in the total tax mix and their 
economic effects in affluent countries. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides information on the importance and development of social security contributions 
in OECD countries since 1980. Section 3 addresses a long debated issue in public finance 
whether social benefits should be financed out of a pure tax or out of a separate social 
security contribution and discusses the nature of social security contributions. Section 4 
3 
 
investigates economic effects of social security contributions, and possible consequences 
for welfare state reform. Section 5 contains a case study: how should the Dutch public 
pension system be financed, by contributions or by general taxes? Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Descriptives  
This section provides information on the importance and development of social security 
contributions in OECD countries. Table 1 (panel a) shows that social security 
contributions add up to on average 9.1 percent of GDP in OECD countries. In several 
European countries, like France, Germany and the Netherlands, this percentage is much 
higher, while some other countries, like Australia, Denmark and New Zealand, have no or 
hardly no social security contributions (according to the OECD definition).1 The general 
trend is upward: between 1980 and 2013 the average level of social security 
contributions increased by 1.7%-points of GDP, although this upward trend was lower for 
Western European countries (+1.3%-points) compared to other OECD countries for 
which long time-series are available (+2.3%-points).  
In most countries social security contributions are an important revenue source. In 2013, 
social security contributions make up around one fourth of total tax revenue in OECD 
countries. In a majority of the countries the share of social security contributions in total 
tax revenue has risen between 1980 and 2013. In France, Italy, Spain and Sweden, 
however, the share of social security contributions has dropped rather substantially. Note 
that the general trend in the group of Western European countries is downward, while 
the data show an increase of 6.5%-points in the other OECD countries for which long 
time-series are available. As a result, both social security contributions as percentage of 
GDP and social security contribution as percentage of total tax revenue converged across 
countries over time; see Table 1. 
  
                                                          
1 It should be noted that these countries have mandatory contributions to private pension schemes which are 
not captured by the declared data. 
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Table 1: Social security contributions, 1980-2013 
  Panel (a): % of GDP  Panel (b) % of total tax revenue 
    1980 1990 2000 2013 Change   1980 1990 2000 2013 Change 
         
 
       
Australia  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
a 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
a 0.0 
Austria  12.0 12.9 14.4 14.6 2.6  30.9 32.9 34.1 34.3 3.4 
Belgium  11.7 13.7 13.6 14.2 2.5  28.8 33.2 31.0 31.7 2.9 
Canada  3.2 4.3 4.8 4.9 1.6  10.5 12.1 13.6 15.9 5.4 
Chile  - 1.5 1.4 1.4    - 9.0 7.3 7.1   
Czech Republic  - - 14.4 14.8    - - 44.3 43.3   
Denmark  0.6 0.9 1.7 0.8 0.2  1.3 2.0 3.6 1.6 0.3 
Estonia  - - 10.9 11.1    - - 35.3 34.8   
Finland  8.2 11.0 11.6 12.7 4.5  23.3 25.6 25.2 28.9 5.6 
France  16.8 18.1 15.5 16.8 -0.1  42.7 44.1 36.0 37.2 -5.5 
Germany  12.5 13.0 14.2 14.0 1.5  34.3 37.5 39.0 38.1 3.8 
Greece  6.8 7.6 10.0 10.6 3.8  32.9 30.2 30.3 31.7 -1.2 
Hungary  - - 11.3 12.9    - - 29.3 33.1   
Iceland  0.6 0.9 2.8 3.6 3.0  2.2 3.1 7.7 10.2 8.0 
Ireland  4.3 4.6 3.7 4.4 0.1  14.3 14.1 11.8 15.5 1.2 
Israel  - - 5.2 5.1    - - 14.7 16.6   
Italy  10.9 12.0 11.6 13.0 2.1  38.0 32.9 28.5 30.4 -7.6 
Japan  7.2 7.5 9.4 12.3
a 5.1  29.1 26.4 35.2 41.6
a 12.5 
Korea  0.2 1.9 3.6 6.4 6.2  1.1 10.1 16.7 26.3 25.2 
Luxembourg  9.8 9.2 9.6 11.3 1.5  28.7 27.0 25.7 28.6 -0.1 
Mexico  2.0 2.1 2.7 3.1 1.0  14.1 13.4 16.5 14.9
a 0.8 
Netherlands  15.4 15.1 14.4 15.0
a -0.4  38.1 37.4 39.1 41.2
a 3.1 
New Zealand  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Norway  9.0 10.8 8.9 9.7 0.8  21.1 26.3 20.9 23.8 2.7 
Poland  - - 12.9 12.1
a    - - 39.5 37.8
a   
Portugal  6.5 7.2 7.9 8.9 2.5  29.5 27.2 25.8 26.7 -2.8 
Slovak Republic  - - 14.0 13.3    - - 41.5 44.9   
Slovenia  - - 13.9 14.8    - - 38.0 40.1   
Spain  10.7 11.2 11.6 11.3 0.6  48.6 35.4 34.8 34.6 -14.0 
Sweden  12.6 13.5 12.9 9.8 -2.8  28.8 27.2 26.4 22.9 -5.9 
Switzerland  5.5 5.6 6.8 6.7 1.3  23.4 23.6 24.5 24.9 1.5 
Turkey  1.9 2.9 4.5 8.0 6.2  14.0 19.7 18.7 27.4 13.4 
United Kingdom  5.6 5.8 5.9 6.2 0.6  16.7 17.0 17.0 18.9 2.2 
United States   5.6 6.6 6.6 6.2 0.6   21.9 25.2 23.4 24.2 2.3 
                 
Mean 34 
countries  6.9 7.4 8.6 9.1 -  22.1 21.9 24.6 26.2 - 
OECD-average b  6.9 7.6 8.0 8.6 1.7  22.1 22.4 22.5 24.3 2.2 
- West EU15  9.6 10.4 10.6 10.9 1.3  29.1 28.2 27.2 28.2 -1.0 
- Other 11  3.2 3.9 4.6 5.5 2.3  12.5 14.5 16.1 19.0 6.5 
Coefficient of 
variation b  0.71 0.67 0.58 0.55 -0.16  0.62 0.54 0.50 0.48 -0.14 
 
a Data refer to the year 2012 
b Average resp. coefficient of variation of 26 countries for which long time-series are available 
 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics; and own calculations 
 
Figure 1 shows that the overall tax structure – the share of main taxes in total revenue – 
has remained quite stable over the period 1980-2012 in the OECD-area. Two tax 
categories show an upward trend: social security contributions (including payroll taxes) 
and general consumption taxes (VAT). The shares of revenues form from personal 
income taxes and from specific consumption taxes (such as taxes on tobacco, alcohol, 
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fuels, environmental related taxes) have dropped. Taxes on personal income (income 
taxes and social security contributions) together account for roughly half of total tax 
revenue, both in 1980 and in 2012. The share of corporate income taxes and property 
taxes did hardly change over time. A relatively sharp fall in revenue from corporate taxes 
in 2008 and 2009 did not continue in later years.  
Figure 1: Share of tax categories in total tax revenue in the OECD-area, 1980-2012 
 
Note: Data are included from 1980 onwards for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States; from 1990 for 
Chile; from 1991 for Hungary and Poland; from 1993 for the Czech Republic and from 1995 for Estonia, Israel, 
the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.        
 
Source : OECD Revenue Statistics; and own calculations 
 
 
Table 2 indicates that on average some 36 percent of social expenditure in OECD 
countries for which long time-series are available is financed through social security 
contributions. But again, there are large differences across countries. In several 
European countries social security contributions cover more than half of the costs of 
social programs. This is the case in Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Turkey. Outside Europe, Japan is the 
only country that relies heavily on social security contributions to finance social 
expenditure. In Anglo Saxon countries on the other hand, social expenditure is mainly 
financed out of general revenue. These countries put less focus on the insurance function 
of the welfare state. Instead, they rely more on private arrangements to cover social 
risks. The average percentage of contributions financing has dropped by almost 10 
percentage points since 1980, indicating that social expenditure has increased more 
rapidly than social contributions. This phenomenon is witnessed more strongly in West 
European countries compared to the other OECD countries for which long time-series are 
available. 
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Table 2: Social security contributions as % of public social expenditure, 1980-2013 
 
  1980 1990 2000 2010 2013 Change 
Australia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0a 0.0 
Austria 54.1 55.3 55.0 49.4 51.6 -2.5 
Belgium 49.8 55.0 55.4 47.6 45.8 -3.9 
Canada 24.3 24.4 30.1 26.1 28.2 3.9 
Chile - 15.5 10.8 12.8 14.4 
 Czech Republic - - 76.6 73.2 72.0 
 Denmark 2.3 3.7 6.7 3.3 2.6 0.3 
Estonia - - 79.1 68.0 68.9 
 Finland 45.8 46.2 49.6 42.2 41.6 -4.2 
France 81.7 72.5 54.6 50.8 52.3 -29.3 
Germany 57.4 61.0 54.1 51.2 54.6 -2.8 
Greece 65.9 45.9 52.3 45.2 43.7 -22.2 
Hungary - - 55.3 50.2 58.2 
 Iceland - 7.0 18.7 21.9 21.2 
 Ireland 26.9 26.6 27.9 18.4 20.1 -6.8 
Israel - - 31.2 33.3 32.7 
 Italy 60.7 55.9 49.7 46.8 45.2 -15.4 
Japan 70.0 68.0 57.5 51.3 51.5b -18.5 
Korea - 66.6 74.6 58.9 62.8 
 Luxembourg 48.0 48.0 48.9 47.9 48.2 0.1 
Mexico - 65.0 54.6 36.5 37.0a 
 Netherlands 62.0 59.0 72.6 55.5 62.0a 0.0 
New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Norway 55.0 49.2 42.9 42.8 44.2 -10.8 
Poland - - 63.6 52.8 60.3a 
 Portugal 67.3 58.0 42.5 34.6 34.6 -32.7 
Slovak Republic - - 78.4 65.4 71.1 
 Slovenia - - 61.0 62.2 62.0 
 Spain 69.3 56.9 58.0 44.0 41.3 -28.0 
Sweden 48.5 47.3 45.7 38.6 34.8 -13.7 
Switzerland 40.4 43.6 39.4 32.4 33.8 -6.6 
Turkey 60.4 53.2 - 51.8 64.3 3.9 
United Kingdom 34.2 35.4 32.0 27.4 27.7 -6.6 
United States 43.6 50.7 46.8 31.8 33.1 -10.5 
Mean 34 countries 46.4 43.3 46.2 40.4 - - 
OECD-average c 45.8 43.8 41.9 35.8 36.2 -9.6 
- West EU15 51.6 48.4 47.0 40.2 40.4  -11.2 
- Other 7 countries 33.3 33.7 30.9 26.3 27.3 -6.1 
Coefficient of variation c 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.47 -0.02 
 
a Data refer to the year 2012 
b Data refer to the year 2011 
c Average resp. coefficient of variation of 22 countries for which long time-series are available 
 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics and OECD Social Expenditure Database; and own calculations  
 
Detailed information on social security contribution rates is given in Table 3. Much 
variation is found around the mean of 34 countries covered in this study (29.3 percent). 
In most countries contribution rates for employers are (much) higher than for insured 
persons - respectively 64 percent and 36 percent of total social security contribution on 
average - although there are some exceptions (Chile, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Slovenia); see Figure 2. Contributions for old age, disability and survivor 
programs are by far the largest in all countries. These contributions accounts for two 
third of total contribution by ensured persons and employers on average. Most countries 
also have contributions for unemployment and sickness programs. In a minority of the 
countries separate contributions are paid for work injury programs and family benefits. 
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Table 3:  Social security contributions, insured person and employer contribution rates, 
by program type, 2014* 
 
Country and 
contributor 
Old-age, 
disability, and 
survivors 
Sickness 
and 
maternity 
Work 
injury 
Unemploy
ment 
Family 
benefits 
Total, all 
programs 
Australia 
Insured person 
Employer 
9.5 
0 
9.5 
0 
0 
0 
c 
0 
c 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9.5 c 
0 
9.5 c 
Austria 
Insured person 
Employer 
22.80 
10.25 
12.55 
7.65 
3.95 
3.70 
1.4 
0 
1.4 
6 
3 
3 
4.5 
0 
4.5 
42.35 
17.20 
25.15 
Belgium 
Insured person 
Employer 
16.36 
7.50 
8.86 
10.85 
4.70 
6.15 
1.33 
0 
1.33 
2.33 
0.87 
1.46 
7 
0 
7 
37.87 
13.07 
24.80 
Canada* 
Insured person 
Employer 
9.9 
4.95 
4.95 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
14.412 j 
6.83 
7.582 d, e, f 
Chile* 
Insured person 
Employer 
11.26 g, h 
10 g 
1.26 h 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
22.26 j 
17.65 
4.61 d 
Czech Republic 
Insured person 
Employer 
28.0 
6.5 
21.5 
15.8 
4.5 
11.3 
0 
0 
b 
1.2 
0 
1.2 
0 
0 
0 
45 
11 
34 
Denmark 
Insured person 
Employer 
c 
c 
c 
0 
0 
c 
a 
0 
a 
8 
8 
c 
0 
0 
0 
8 
8 
0 
Estonia 
Insured person 
Employer 
22 
2 
20 
13 
0 
13 
0 
0 
a 
3 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
38 
4 
34 
Finland 
Insured person 
Employer 
23.30 
5.55 
17.75 
4.30 
2.16 
2.14 
0.1 
0 
0.1 
2.9 
0.7 
2.2 
0 
0 
0 
30.60 
8.41 
22.19 
France 
Insured person 
Employer 
24,75 
10.05 
14.70 
13.85 
0.75 
13.10 
0 
0 
b 
6.7 
2.4 
4.3 
5.4 
0 
5.4 
50.7 
13.2 
37.5 
Germany 
Insured person 
Employer 
18.90 
9.45 
9.45 
17.550 
9.225 
8.325 
1.3 
0 
1.3 
3.0 
1.5 
1.5 
0 
0 
0 
40.750 
20.175 
20.575 
Greece 
Insured person 
Employer 
20.00 
6.67 
13.33 
7.65 
2.55 
5.10 
1 
a 
1 a 
5.00 
1.83 
3.17 
2 
1 
1 
35.65 
12.05 
23.60 
Hungary 
Insured person 
Employer 
35.5 
8.5 
27.0 
6 
6 
a 
a 
a 
a 
1.5 
1.5 
a 
0 
0 
0 
43 
16 
27 
Iceland 
Insured person 
Employer 
19.79 
4.00 
15.79 
0 
0 
a 
0 
0 
a 
0 
0 
a 
0 
0 
0 
19.79 
4.00 
15.79 
Ireland 
Insured person 
Employer 
8.25 
4.00 
4.25 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
8,25 
4.00 
4.25 
Israel 
Insured person 
Employer 
1.94 
0.34 
1.60 
0.15 
0.04 
0.11 
0.37 
0 
0.37 
0.04 
0.01 
0.03 
1.32 
0 
1.32 
3.82 
0.39 
3.43 
Italy 
Insured person 
Employer 
33.00 
9.19 
23.81 
2.68 
0 
2.68 
3 
0 
3 
3.51 
0 
3.51 
0.68 
0 
0.68 
42.87 
9.19 
33.68 
Japan 
Insured person 
Employer 
17.474 
8.737 
8.737 
c 
c 
c 
0.25 
0 
0.25 
1.35 
0.50 
0.85 
0.15 
0 
0.15 
19.224 c 
9.237 c 
9.987 c 
Korea 
Insured person 
Employer 
9.0 
4.5 
4.5 
a 
a 
a 
0.6 
0 
0.6 
1.595 
0.695 
0.900 
… 
… 
… 
11.195 
5.195 
6.000 
Luxembourg 
Insured person 
Employer 
16 
8 
8 
7.5 
4.7 
2.8 
1.15 
0 
1.15 
0 
c 
0 
0 
0 
0 
24.65 
12.70 
11.95 
Mexico* 
Insured person 
Employer 
8.65 
1.75 i 
6.9 i 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
33.7 j 
2.4 
31.3 d, f 
Netherlands 
Insured person 
24.2 
18.5 
7.7 
c 
a 
a 
9.87 
4.20 
0 
0 
41.77 
22.70 
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Country and 
contributor 
Old-age, 
disability, and 
survivors 
Sickness 
and 
maternity 
Work 
injury 
Unemploy
ment 
Family 
benefits 
Total, all 
programs 
Employer 5.7 7.7 a a 5.67 0 19.07 
New Zealand 
Insured person 
Employer 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
c 
0 
c 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 c 
0 
0 c 
Norway 
Insured person 
Employer 
22.3 
8.2 
14.1 
a 
a 
a 
0 
0 
a 
a 
a 
a 
0 
0 
0 
22.3 
8.2 
14.1 
Poland 
Insured person 
Employer 
27.52 
11.26 
16.26 
11.45 
11.45 
0 
0.67 
0 
0.67 
2.45 
0 
2.45 
0 
0 
0 
42.09 
22.71 
19.38 
Portugal 
Insured person 
Employer 
34.75 
11.00 
23.75 
a 
a 
a 
0 
0 
a. c 
a 
a 
a 
0 
0 
0 
34.75 
11.00 
23.75 
Slovak Republic 
Insured person 
Employer 
27 
7 
20 
16.8 
5.4 
11.4 
0.8 
0 
0.8 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
46.6 
13.4 
33.2 
Slovenia 
Insured person 
Employer 
24.35 
15.50 
8.85 
13.65 
6.46 
7.19 
0.53 
a 
0.53 a 
0.20 
0.14 
0.06 
0 
0 
0 
38.73 
22.10 
16.63 
Spain 
Insured person 
Employer 
28.3 
4.7 
23.6 
a 
a 
a 
1.98 
0 
1.98 
7.10 
1.55 
5.55 
0 
0 
0 
37.38 
6.25 
31.13 
Sweden 
Insured person 
Employer 
22.73 
7.00 
15.73 
12.48 
0 
12.48 
0.3 
0 
0.3 
2.91 
0 
2.91 
0 
0 
0 
38.42 
7.00 
31.42 
Switzerland 
Insured person 
Employer 
23.8 
11.9 
11.9 
0.50 
0.25 
0.25 
0 
0 
b 
2.2 
1.1 
1.1 
0.1 
0 
0.1 
26.60 
13.25 
13.35 
Turkey 
Insured person 
Employer 
20 
9 
11 
13.5 
5.0 
8.5 
0 
0 
a 
3 
1 
2 
… 
… 
… 
36.5 
15.0 
21.5 
United Kingdom 
Insured person 
Employer 
20.95 
9.05 
11.90 
3.95 
2.05 a 
1.90 a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
0 
0 
0 
24.9 
11.1 
13.8 
United States* 
Insured person 
Employer 
12.4 
6.2 
6.2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
23.42 j 
7.65 
15.77 f 
Mean 34 countries 
Insured person 
 Employer 
19.5 
7.3 
12.2 
7.8 
3.0 
5.6 
0.6 
0.0 
1.0 
2.9 
1.3 
1.9 
0.8 
0.0 
0.7 
29.3 
10.4 
18.8 
 
Notes: This table provides an overview and contribution rates are not directly comparable across programs and 
countries. The earnings used to calculate contributions can vary and some rates are subject to contribution 
ceilings. In some cases, only certain groups, such as wage earners, are represented. When the contribution rate 
varies, either the average or the lowest rate in the range is used. In most cases, contribution rates for 
individual accounts do not include administrative fees. In some countries, certain benefits, such as disability 
and survivors, may be financed under another program. Sickness and Maternity contributions include medical 
benefits where applicable. 
* = The insured and employer contribution rates for the American countries relate to 2013, and not to 2014.  
- = not available 
… = not applicable 
a = All or certain benefits are financed under another program. 
b = Total cost. 
c = Nonstandard financing. 
d = Employers pay the total cost of work injury benefits. 
e = Contributions may be higher in some provinces. 
f = Government pays the total cost of family allowances. 
g = Contributions finance old-age benefits only. 
h = Contributions finance disability and survivors insurance only. 
i = Also includes the contribution rates for other programs. 
j = Includes Old Age, Disability, and Survivors; Sickness and Maternity; Work Injury; Unemployment; and 
Family Allowances. In some countries, the rate may not cover all of these programs. 
 
Sources: Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe, The Americas, Asia and the Pacific, 
International Social Security Association; and own calculation of the mean. 
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Figure 2: Social security contribution rates and their composition across countries, 2014 
 
Source: See below Table 3 
 
 
3. Taxes, social security contributions and prices 
A long debated issue in public finance is whether social benefits should be financed out of 
the general budget, or out of a separate source, that is through social security 
contributions or payroll taxes (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984). The general idea behind 
the contributory approach is that the social security system should be considered to 
provide for insurance, that is retirement income and unemployment compensation. There 
is a relation between the contributions paid and the entitlement to benefits. Critics, 
however, have argued that this insurance element is generally fictitious (Musgrave and 
Musgrave, 1984: 727). Those who pay the contributions are often not those who receive 
the benefits. In a pay-as-you-go pension scheme for example each generation of retirees 
has its benefits paid for by those of working age. Moreover, social security contributions 
or payroll taxes do not rank high on equity and efficiency grounds. Payroll taxes are 
levied on wage income only rather than income more broadly. And these levies are often 
regressive, because usually an income ceiling is set. 
Social security contributions have strong similarities with taxes.2 Both levies are 
compulsory by statutory rule. But there are also important differences. Taxes imply a 
reduction of purchasing power without anything being directly given in return. Revenues 
are used for public services, but there is no direct relation between taxes paid and 
benefits received. As far as social contributions are concerned, a distinction can be made 
between contributions to occupational insurance schemes and national (universal) 
                                                          
2 This paragraph is based on Goudswaard et al (2006). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
Is
ra
el
D
en
m
ar
k
Ir
el
an
d
A
us
tr
al
ia
S
ou
th
 K
or
ea
C
an
ad
a
Ja
pa
n
Ic
el
an
d
C
hi
le
N
or
w
ay
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
S
w
itz
er
la
nd
Fi
nl
an
d
M
ex
ic
o
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Tu
rk
ey
S
pa
in
B
el
gi
um
Es
to
ni
a
S
w
ed
en
S
lo
ve
ni
a
G
er
m
an
y
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
Po
la
nd
A
us
tr
ia
It
al
y
H
un
ga
ry
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
S
lo
va
k 
R
ep
ub
lic
Fr
an
ce
Employer Insured person
10 
 
insurance schemes. Social security contributions to occupational insurance programs 
have traditionally been based on the concept that an entitlement is received in return for 
the contribution paid. Usually, both the contribution and the benefit are related to the 
employee’s wage level. National social insurance schemes on the other hand, show no 
(or hardly any) connection between the level of the benefit and the contributions paid in 
the past. This is generally the case for pay-as-you-go public pension schemes. Therefore, 
the differences between national social insurance contributions and taxes are only small, 
probably also in the employees’ perceptions.  
Because of the link between contributions and benefits in occupational social insurance 
schemes, it seems plausible that the corresponding contributions are seen as the price 
for an individual benefit. Freedom of choice of the employee may also be important here. 
Generally, however, employees are included in occupational schemes even when they 
would prefer not to participate. The differences between taxes, contributions and prices 
can be shown as a sliding scale; see Diagram 1. 
 
Diagram 1. Taxes, social insurance contributions, and prices 
 
 Taxes Social insurance contributions Prices 
 
Payment 
Compulsory 
payment by  
statutory rule 
Compulsory 
payment by  
statutory rule 
 
Payment based on 
(collective) labor 
agreement; limited 
individual freedom 
of choice 
 
Free choice of 
consumer 
Return Not direct 
 
More or less direct, 
but mostly not 
equivalent 
Direct, more or less 
equivalent 
Direct and 
equivalent 
 
 
A pure tax is paid compulsory and has no direct return. A pure price is paid voluntarily by 
an individual or household and has a direct and equivalent return. Social security 
contributions can be found in between. Contributions are typically forcibly imposed. This 
gives an inevitable “tax” character to social security contributions. The compulsory 
nature introduces the possibility of an ex ante redistribution in the arrangement. This is 
usually the case for national social insurance schemes, like public pension schemes with 
income related contributions and flat rate benefits. However, social contributions show 
more resemblance with prices as the connection between payment and return is clearer. 
This is often the case for occupational insurance schemes.    
 
4. Economic effects 
Who bears the burden? 
While the importance of social security contributions or payroll taxes has grown, there 
are serious concerns on their economic effects on labour costs and employment. Labour 
taxation drives a wedge between labour costs of the employer and real wage income of 
the employee. As a consequence, both labour demand and labour supply may be 
affected. Ultimately, high levies on labour may reduce employment and increase 
unemployment. This is often mentioned as one of the causes of relatively high 
unemployment figures in Europe. As a consequences, a debate has been triggered on 
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whether taxation should be shifted from labour to tax bases less detrimental to growth 
(European Commission, 2013).    
The payment of social security contributions is usually shared by employers and 
employees. At first sight, an increase in employee contributions reduces real wage and 
may induce labour supply effects, while contributions paid by the employer raise labour 
costs and therefore reduce the demand for labour. However, the actual effects of social 
security contributions and payroll taxes depend on their incidence. Economists are 
interested in who actually bears the burden of taxes and contributions instead of whom 
they are imposed on. The actual incidence may differ strongly from the intended 
incidence. The government however has no grip on the shifting of taxes; after all, this is 
governed by market forces. Who actually bears the burden of labour taxes depends on 
the elasticities of demand and supply for labour (Stiglitz, 2000). The market party that is 
the least sensitive to changes in the wage rate will bear the largest part of the tax 
burden.  
There have been many studies on tax shifting. Most studies conclude that there is a 
positive linkage between the tax level or the tax wedge and real wages. This would imply 
that taxes are to some extent shifted to employers (OECD, 1995). Nickell (2003) finds on 
the basis of various studies substantial tax wedge effects on labour costs; on average a 
10 percent rise in the tax wedge raises labour costs by 5 percent. As far as the impact on 
employment is concerned, he finds that a 10 percent increase in the tax wedge reduces 
labor input by around 2 percent. This is a smaller, but not insignificant effect. 
In a recent meta-study Melguizo and González-Páramo (2013) conclude that about two 
thirds of labour taxes is borne by employees and one third by employers. However, there 
is much variation across different countries to view this result as a precise estimate. An 
explanation for this is that who eventually bears the taxes is related to the labour market 
institutions in a country. If trade unions have a strong influence on wage formation, 
shifting towards employers is more plausible. The influence of trade unions makes the 
aggregated labor supply more elastic. The finding that employees bear a larger part of 
labour taxes is consistent with recent estimates of labour supply estimates, which are 
quite low. Saez et al (2012) report that the best available estimates of the long run 
elasticity range from 0.12 to 0.40. Lichter et al (2013) analyzed labour demand 
elasticities. Their best guess is an average labour demand elasticity of -0.3. The long-run 
elasticity is found to be higher. This is consistent with the notion that there is some 
degree of sharing of taxes and contributions.  
While empirical studies using more aggregated data usually find that a major part of 
labour taxes are shifted onto workers via lower wages, recent micro studies find that a 
significant part of the burden is borne by employers (Saez et al, 2012). One explanation 
why studies using micro-data may be more likely to find employers bear a substantial 
part of the burden of social security contributions than macro-studies do is the type of 
variation in tax rates utilized (European Commission, 2015). Micro-studies exploit 
variation between workers and employers, whereas macro-studies exploit variation over 
time or between countries. Moreover, taxes may be shifted from employers to workers 
(or vice versa) not at the individual level, but at a higher level, e.g. the employer, 
sectoral or market level (European Commission, 2015). 
 
Different reactions to taxes and prices 
It is plausible that perception of social security contributions depends on the nature of 
those contributions, as has been argued in section 3. Barr (1992, p772) states: “If 
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workers discount future benefits entirely, contributions are equivalent to an income tax; 
but where future benefits are perceived as actuarial fair, contributions are not a tax but 
simply the price of insurance which, like any other price, has few distortionary effects”. 
Aaron (1982) argues that if the employee sees a clear relation between payments of 
social insurance contributions and accrued rights, those contributions will actually have 
the nature of a price and not of a tax. Stated more precisely, the tax element is equal to 
the difference between the contributions paid and the value the employee attaches to the 
entitlement received in return. It is then plausible that those contributions will have 
fewer distorting effects on the labor market than taxes (Summers, 1989).3 Moreover, 
Gruber (1997) shows that the strength of the link between the labour taxes (social 
security contributions) and the benefits received by the workers, strongly affects the 
incidence both in the short run and in the long run. He interprets this finding by 
indicating that workers value the type of insurance provided by the social security 
contribution system, and are therefore willing to pay a price for it. This suggests that the 
link between social security contributions and benefits matters for their incidence. 
Does labor supply indeed react differently to changes in social insurance contributions 
and taxes? In a recent study Lehmann et al (2013) analyze the relative responsiveness 
of labor income to payroll taxes (social security contributions) versus income taxes. They 
argue that empirical evidence so far is not conclusive because the responses to payroll 
taxes and income taxes could not be analyzed at the same time, due to the absence of 
simultaneous reforms to both schedules for similar individuals. Therefore, Lehmann et al 
analyzed reforms of both income taxes and payroll taxes in France for the period 2003-
2006. Their estimate for the elasticity of gross labor income with respect to the marginal 
net-of-income-tax rate is around 0.2, while they find no response to the marginal net-of-
payroll-tax rate. According to the authors an explanation for the latter result might be 
that institutions (the minimum wage and collective bargaining in France) fail to respond 
to payroll-tax changes, at least in the short-run. Another explanation might be the 
different nature and perception of payroll taxes. Anyway, Lehmann et al conclude that 
financing social security expenditure through payroll taxes is less distortive than through 
income taxes.  
Ooghe et al (2003) tested the hypothesis that in collective wage negotiations, social 
contributions with a clear return have less impact on wage costs than general taxes. 
Based on data for several European countries they indeed find support for their 
hypothesis. They argue that trade unions will be more inclined to incorporate increases in 
the burden of social security contributions into net wage offers if there is a recognizable 
return for employees. 
 
Pension savings 
Relatively much attention in the literature is paid to behavioral reactions to pension 
contributions. Do employees view higher pension contributions as being the price for 
higher personal entitlements, so that they reduce their private savings? In a well-known 
paper, Feldstein (1974) found that public pension provisions leads to a substantial 
reduction of private savings. This paper, however, has been criticized in the literature. 
                                                          
3 This is consistent with a recent review of the literature by the European Commission (2015): different taxes 
do have different effects on net real wages. In studies looking at income tax, payroll tax and social security 
contributions only, employees are found to bear 59 percent of the burden of taxes. But in studies that look at 
the overall fiscal or salary wedge (including indirect taxes, or in the latter instance, all factors that contribute to 
wedge between producer and consumer purchasing power), employees are found to bear 79 percent of the 
total burden. 
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Barr (1992) shows that the results of empirical research are mixed. Gale (1998) finds for 
the US a small substitution between pension wealth and private financial wealth, but a 
much larger substitution between pension wealth and private non-financial wealth 
(mainly houses). Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) did an empirical study for the United 
Kingdom.  They conclude that changes in the flat rate basic pension do not have a clear 
effect on private savings, while changes in wage-related supplementary pension schemes 
have a negative effect. Bottazzi et al (2006) studied the effects of Italian pension 
reforms. They find that there is substantial substitution between private wealth and 
pension wealth, especially by workers that are better informed about their pension 
wealth. It can be concluded from these studies that pension contribution are seen, at 
least to some extent, as savings. 
Disney (2004) analyzed the economic effects of pension contributions for several 
countries. He distinguishes between a tax component in the pension contribution and a 
savings component. The savings component reflects the buildup of individual rights. 
Disney concludes that the distortive effects of pension contributions are smaller when the 
savings component in the contributions is larger, that is, as the pension system is more 
“actuarially fair”.  
We can conclude that there is ample evidence for the conclusion the nature of pension 
contributions is relevant for their economic effects.  
 
Consequences for welfare state reform? 
The studies discussed above give support for welfare state reforms that lead to a more 
direct connection between the payment of contributions and the individual return. 
Lindbeck (1994) views the replacement of taxes by prices as an important reform 
strategy for the welfare state. He argues that if social security benefits are actuarially fair 
on the margin, and the fees are based on marginal costs, then marginal tax wedges in 
these (welfare state) systems would, in principle, be eliminated. On the basis of similar 
arguments, several authors have suggested that introducing mandatory private saving 
accounts would contribute to the sustainability of the welfare state (Bovenberg and 
Sørensen, 2004; Orszag and Snower, 1999; and Fölster, 2001). Individual savings may 
be used for pensions, but also for unemployment or temporary disability. By using 
individual saving accounts, the incentives for labor participation will be strengthened, 
because periods of nonparticipation would reduce savings and thus also future income.  
However, social saving accounts have also some drawbacks. Redistribution is more 
difficult. Also, savings accounts lack both the efficiency of risk pooling. People may save 
inefficiently high amounts. Others may not have enough savings after a long spell of 
unemployment. Those problems can be relaxed to some extent by combining social 
savings accounts with a basic level of social insurance.  
In general, a more visible relationship between social contributions and associated 
benefits would help to reduce the distortive effects of contributions. It is important that 
citizens get a good view of their entitlement to various benefits and other arrangements. 
The visibility and the nature of social contributions can be important for the perception of 
the costs of social insurances and – associated with that – for the behavioral responses 
to these contributions. When contributions are seen as a price instead of as a tax there 
will probably fewer distorting effects on the labor market, such as decrease of labor 
supply or a shift onto the employer, causing higher wage costs.  
 
5. Contributions or general taxes: a case study for the Dutch public pension scheme 
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As argued in section 3, contributions to national social insurance programs with a 
redistributive character can be seen as taxes. This may raise the question why 
(earmarked) contributions are used to finance these programs instead of general taxes. 
The case of the Netherlands is an interesting example. In this country there has indeed 
been a lot of debate on the way the public pensions should be financed: through 
earmarked contributions or through general taxes. The public old age pension scheme 
provides a flat rate benefit from the age of 65 (as of 2015 65 and three months). The 
pension age is gradually increased to 67 in the year 2021. Entitlement for a public 
pension benefit accumulates at a rate of 2 per cent for each year of residence between 
15 and 65 years of age. The benefit level for two pensioners living together is 
approximately equal to the net minimum wage, while a person living alone receives 70 
percent of the net minimum wage. The public pension is financed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis, through earmarked contributions, that depend on taxable income. These 
contributions are only paid by persons under the age of 65 and not by the elderly.4 This 
is based on the so-called insurance principle: those who receive benefits from an 
insurance should not pay premiums any more. This argument is not very strong though. 
The public old age pension scheme can hardly be seen as an insurance scheme. Essential 
for an insurance is that there is a relationship between premiums and entitlement to 
benefits. There is no such relationship in the public pension scheme: contributions are 
income-dependent and benefits are flat rate. Non-working residents are also entitled to a 
public pension, even if they have never paid any contributions.  
A first step towards financing out of general tax revenue was taken by a policy measure 
in 1997 to set a ceiling on the contribution rate (17.9 percent). Because expenditures on 
public pensions have grown rapidly in the last decades, this policy measure implied that a 
growing share of total public pension expenditure is financed out of general tax revenue, 
in 2015 about one third. In terms of economic effects public pension contributions or 
taxes do not make any difference. There is no link between the payment of public 
pension contributions and the build-up of rights. As a consequence, the distortive effects 
on the labour market will be the same, as has been argued in section 4. However, there 
is another important difference: the elderly do not pay contributions for the public old 
age pension, but they do pay all other taxes. A larger share of tax financing thus implies 
higher taxes and lower net incomes for the elderly.  
Several committees and political parties have suggested to further increase the share of 
general revenue financing of the public pension scheme. For example the Dutch Social 
and Economic Council, an advisory body of government, argues that in order to cope with 
the rapidly rising costs of the public pension scheme, it is necessary to systematically 
broaden the base for public pension financing (Social and Economic Council, 2005). 
Future costs as a result of the ageing population should be borne by society as a whole, 
including the elderly. This should contribute, according to the Social Economic Council, to 
a more even distribution of income within and between generations. At this point, it 
should be mentioned that the net public pension benefit is indexed to the net minimum 
wage. This implies that higher taxes on the elderly will be born especially by pensioners 
with additional (pension) income on top of the public old age pension benefit. In general, 
reliance on general tax revenue will be more progressive than contributions.  
                                                          
4 This only holds for the contributions for the old age pension program. There is a separate contribution for the 
survivors program, which is also paid by the elderly. 
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Until now, the government has not decided to speed up the increase in the share of 
general revenue financing. Tax increases for the elderly are obviously not very popular, 
although recent research shows that the financial position of pensioners in the 
Netherlands has improved substantially during the last decades, also relative to the 
younger population (Knoef et al, 2013). Another concern is put forward by Diamond 
(2001), who studied the Dutch pension system. He argues that reliance on general tax 
revenue can inject too much short-run budgetary concern into what should be a slowly 
evolving long-run system.    
 
 
6. Conclusions 
A long debated issue in public finance is whether social benefits should be financed out of 
the general budget, or out of a separate source, that is through social security 
contributions or payroll taxes. In actual practice, most countries have chosen to use 
social security contributions as an important revenue source. In 2014, social security 
contributions make up around one fourth of total tax revenue in OECD countries. In a 
majority of the countries the share of social security contributions in total tax revenue 
has risen since 1980. On average, more than one third of social expenditure in OECD 
countries is financed through contributions.  
While the importance of social security contributions has grown, there are serious 
concerns on their economic effects. High levies on labour may reduce employment and 
are seen as one of the causes of high unemployment figures. The problem is that we do 
not know exactly who actually bears the burden of taxes on labour, if behavioral 
responses are taken into account. Recent estimates suggest that about two thirds of 
taxes on labour are born by employees and one third by employers. Micro studies, 
however, find that a higher part of the burden is borne by employers.  
We find substantial evidence in the literature that the nature of social security 
contributions matters for the behavioral responses to these contributions. With a clear 
connection between payment of contributions and accrued rights, the employee will 
perceive this contribution as a price instead of as a tax. As a consequence, these 
contributions will be less distortive, in terms of labour supply, wage costs and private 
savings. This can be the case for social contributions paid for occupational insurance 
schemes. This finding gives some support for welfare state reforms leading to a closer 
link between contributions and the individual return. Also, in order to reduce distortive 
effects, it is important to make the relationship between social contributions and 
associated benefits more visible for citizens.  
On the other hand, contributions paid for national social insurance schemes with a 
redistributive character can be seen as taxes and will have similar economic effects as 
taxes. As shown in a case study for the Netherlands, there are several arguments to 
finance such schemes out of general revenue instead of separate earmarked social 
security contributions.  
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